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Throughout the year, there was signifi-
cant debate about Pacific regionalism 
and the future of agencies that make 
up the Council of Regional Organiza-
tions of the Pacific (crop). 
A major review of the Pacific Plan 
outlined new priorities for the region, 
while summits highlighted the grow-
ing influence of Melanesian nations 
and the links between climate change, 
disasters, and development. Pacific 
governments began preparing regional 
policies on climate, oceans, fisher-
ies, and sustainable development to 
be carried onto the global stage in 
coming months as the United Nations 
(UN) declared 2014 as the Interna-
tional Year for Small Island States.
There was ongoing debate about 
Fiji’s role in regional structures, at a 
time of increasing South-South coop-
eration and new aid donors challeng-
ing old paradigms in the region. With 
eight Pacific nations scheduled to hold 
national elections during 2014, the 
September 2013 poll in Australia—the 
region’s largest aid, trade, and mili-
tary power—began a realignment of 
regional relationships with the election 
of a conservative government under 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott. 
The Pacific Islands Forum Secre-
tariat (pifs) and other crop member 
agencies are under pressure from 
all directions: donor demands, bur-
geoning subregional organizations, 
civil society critiques, and concern 
from some member governments 
that resources are not flowing to the 
national level.
The role and mandate of crop 
agencies was analyzed during a review 
of the 2005 Pacific Plan for Strength-
ening Regional Integration and Coop-
eration. Throughout 2013, former 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) Prime Min-
ister Sir Mekere Morauta led a review 
team that visited all Forum member 
countries, together with associate 
members New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia. Morauta’s team presented 
an interim report in July, briefed 
Forum leaders on their findings at the 
annual summit in the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) in September, 
and then released their final report at 
year’s end.
Following the 2012 Winder review 
of the Forum Secretariat (which was 
critical of the priorities and capacities 
of the regional organization), Morau-
ta’s team began looking at Pacific Plan 
priorities. The review soon broadened 
to a much wider debate about the 
future of regionalism, highlighting 
uncertainty about the role and man-
date of the Forum Secretariat and 
other regional institutions. 
Addressing Forum leaders in 
Majuro, Morauta stated: “There is 
a compelling argument for greater 
regional cooperation and integra-
tion across the Pacific. . . . However, 
progress in regionalism has in our 
opinion slowed down, and by too 
much.” Describing a region “at the 
crossroads,” Morauta was sharply 
critical of the 2005 Pacific Plan: “It 
is very difficult to see how the Pacific 
Plan or the processes surrounding it 
are—now—driving regional integra-
tion with the scope, pace and scale 
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intended in its original framing. Con-
fidence in the Pacific Plan and some of 
the institutions around it has fallen to 
the point where some observers ques-
tion their survival” (Morauta 2013, 
3–4).
In the final report (Pacific Plan 
Review 2013), the review team pre-
sented a range of options for coming 
years:
•  the establishment of a high-
level council of past and present 
Forum chairs to restructure the 
Forum  Secretariat;
•  devolving more power to minis-
terial meetings and subregional 
organizations, to avoid overload-
ing the agenda of the annual 
Forum leaders meeting;
•  debate on the criteria for Forum 
membership, given the grow-
ing involvement of the US and 
French territories, and whether 
“self-determination” should 
still be a defining factor for full 
Forum membership;
•  further work to articulate the 
concept of sustainable develop-
ment;
•  better coordination and man-
agement of donor support for 
regionalism.
Forum leaders agreed to send the 
review findings to the Forum Officials 
Committee, while Papua New Guinea 
will host a special leaders’ retreat in 
April 2014 to discuss a new frame-
work for regional integration.
The review also highlighted the 
role of subregional organizations, 
in a year the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (msg) celebrated its twenty-
fifth anniversary. The msg Secretariat 
in Port Vila organized celebrations in 
every Melanesian capital and a major 
summit in New Caledonia in June. 
The summit debated new initiatives 
on Melanesian trade, West Papua, 
regional peacekeeping, and labor 
mobility between the largest Island 
nations. The outgoing chair, Prime 
Minister Voreqe Bainimarama of Fiji, 
said the msg was “taking bold steps 
to restructure the landscape of the 
Pacific” (Maclellan 2013c, 18). 
msg leaders received the report 
of an Eminent Persons Group led by 
former Fiji Foreign Minister Kaliopate 
Tavola, looking at the successes and 
challenges of the past and mapping 
priorities for the msg’s future. At the 
summit, Melanesian leaders appointed 
Tavola as a roving msg representa-
tive. This positions the Fijian states-
man as a front-runner for the post of 
secretary-general of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, when incumbent Tuiloma 
Neroni Slade of Sāmoa retires at the 
end of his second term in 2014.
There was also a change of leader-
ship following the summit, with Fiji 
handing the msg chair to Victor Tutu-
goro of the Front de Libération Natio-
nale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks) for 
2013–2015. Ironically, the incoming 
chair of the Polynesian Leaders Group 
(plg) is French Polynesia’s President 
Gaston Flosse, an outspoken opponent 
of independence in the French Pacific 
territories. 
Another major transition was the 
retirement of Jimmie Rodgers, the 
long-serving director-general of the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(spc). After working as deputy direc-
tor for many years at the spc’s Nabua 
branch in Fiji, Dr Rodgers took over 
the top job at spc headquarters in 
Noumea for eight years. He led a 
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massive restructuring of the regional 
technical agency, with the creation 
of three overarching divisions for 
economic, human, and sustainable 
development. The spc has expanded 
to more than six hundred staff, with 
sub-offices in a number of countries. 
Rodgers was replaced by Dr Colin 
Tukuitonga, a Niuean who previously 
worked as chief executive officer of 
the New Zealand Ministry for Pacific 
Island Affairs and as head of the spc 
Public Health Division.
The incoming spc director-general 
will lead a review of the agency’s 
governance structures and promote 
new partnerships for the agency, 
including the proposed creation of 
new categories for associate members 
and observers and a bid to obtain 
permanent observer status at the UN 
General Assembly (a status already 
obtained by the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat).
Renewed debate about regionalism 
comes at a time of shifting trends in 
trade, labor mobility, and aid delivery, 
but also when regional organizations 
are still struggling with the dilemma of 
Fiji’s role in the region.
Most Pacific countries are reliant 
on Official Development Assistance, 
but the provision of aid is being 
transformed in a number of ways. 
Aid flows are affected by the rise of 
new donors, especially from Asia; 
the expansion of remittances and 
direct investment as sources of rev-
enue; debates over aid effectiveness 
and the quality as well as quantity 
of development assistance; the link 
between development aid and climate 
financing; and the restructuring of aid 
delivery by donors like Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada.
The shifting landscape of interna-
tional aid was evident at the 2011 
summit on aid effectiveness in Busan, 
Korea. This meeting highlighted new 
trends in global aid governance, with 
the Development Assistance Commit-
tee of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(oecd) increasingly sidelined by the 
involvement of nontraditional donors 
and civil society organizations. The 
post-Busan paradigm views aid along-
side other available resources for pov-
erty reduction (such as investment and 
remittance flows), with an increased 
focus on transparency and an empha-
sis on South-South cooperation rather 
than traditional North-South donor-
recipient arrangements.
Western donors in the Pacific have 
been stressing the importance of the 
Cairns Compact on Strengthening 
Development Coordination. After the 
2009 leaders meeting in Cairns, the 
Forum initiated a series of thirteen 
peer reviews of aid management in 
the Islands, which were completed in 
2013 with reviews of Solomon Islands 
(September), Cook Islands (October), 
and Sāmoa (November). 
A range of new aid donors are 
operating in the Pacific, including 
China, south Korea, Indonesia, Israel, 
and United Arab Emirates, which 
complicates the scene for traditional 
donors. Even Papua New Guinea has 
begun to allocate small but strate-
gic amounts of aid to other Island 
nations, including climate adaptation 
funding to Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
and Tonga, and 50 million PNG kina 
(approximately us$20.5 million) to 
assist Fiji in preparations for its 2014 
elections. At the 2013 Forum lead-
ers meeting in Majuro, PNG Prime 
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Minister Peter O’Neill stated that his 
government would introduce a special 
budget allocation in 2014 to fund a 
regional development assistance pro-
gram (Maclellan 2013d).
A September resolution in the 
UN General Assembly, cosponsored 
by forty-seven nations, highlighted 
improved cooperation between the 
United Nations and Pacific regional 
organizations, following the 2011 visit 
to the Pacific Islands Forum by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.
Australia remains the largest aid, 
trade, and military power in the South 
Pacific, but the country’s September 
2013 national elections opened a new 
era for engagement with the region. 
Despite bipartisan continuity on trade 
and security issues, the incoming con-
servative Coalition government under 
Tony Abbott is abandoning key poli-
cies adopted by Kevin Rudd and Julia 
Gillard of the Australian Labor Party 
between 2007 and 2013.
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop 
detailed new policies for the region, 
including normalization of relations 
with the Bainimarama regime in Fiji, a 
major restructuring and reduction of 
Australia’s aid program, the expansion 
of asylum seeker detention centers in 
Nauru and on PNG’s Manus Island, 
and cuts to money pledged for climate 
adaptation funding. At the same time, 
she pledged new engagement with 
Papua New Guinea, with renewed 
support for security sector reform and 
significant Australian investment in 
the country’s liquefied natural gas and 
oil industry.
A week before the September elec-
tions, incoming Australian Treasurer 
Joe Hockey announced that a$4.5 bil-
lion will be cut from planned expan-
sion of the Australian aid program 
over the next four years, abandon-
ing Australia’s bipartisan pledge 
to increase Official Development 
Assistance to 0.5 percent of gross 
national income (one Australian dollar 
is approximately us$.90). In Janu-
ary 2014, Foreign Minister Bishop 
announced a$650 million in cuts 
to the existing 2013–14 aid budget, 
affecting bilateral, regional, and global 
programs. The Pacific lost at least 
a$64 million in direct aid, as well as 
funding channeled through regional 
and international bodies (Maclellan 
2014a). 
The aid cuts came as Australia fol-
lowed Canada and New Zealand in 
closing down its independent statutory 
aid agency. The Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) 
was abolished, merging its operations 
into the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (dfat). Nongovernmental 
organizations expressed concern that 
the merger means disruption of aid 
delivery and the loss of many experi-
enced staff as dfat takes over respon-
sibility for Australia’s a$5 billion aid 
program.
At the November 2013 Common-
wealth Heads of Government Meet-
ing, Small Island and Least Developed 
Country governments were shocked 
by announcements from Canada and 
Australia that they would not contrib-
ute funding to the new Green Climate 
Fund, an important global mechanism 
to assist with climate adaptation and 
mitigation (Maclellan 2013e). Aus-
tralia had been cochair of the Green 
Climate Fund board until October, 
but the incoming Abbott government 
has moved to cut funding for interna-
tional climate activities as well as to 
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eliminate Australia’s domestic carbon 
tax and Climate Change Authority. (In 
2012–13, Australia spent a$74 million 
on global environment programs; by 
the end of the 2013–14 budget cuts, 
this amount had been reduced to 
zero.)
These changes will worry Pacific 
governments, which stress the link 
between climate funding, energy, and 
development. These themes were 
highlighted in March at the Pacific 
Energy Summit in Auckland and the 
May Pacific Climate Change Financ-
ing Workshop in Nadi. The workshop 
considered a new Pacific Climate 
Change Finance Assessment Frame-
work and a case study on Nauru, 
to showcase the best mechanisms 
to access and utilize climate finance 
(Pasisi and others 2013a, 2013b).
Reduction of climate finance will 
severely impact small island states 
already affected by extreme weather 
events. In January 2013, governments 
launched the Pacific Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance fund, a pilot program 
designed to guarantee post-disaster 
reconstruction funding for smaller 
states. A year later, after Category 5 
Cyclone Ian devastated the Ha‘apai 
Islands, Tonga became the first coun-
try in the region to access us$1.27 
million from the insurance fund. Cook 
Islands joined five other countries 
(Marshall Islands, Sāmoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu) in the 
second season of the pilot, which runs 
between November 2013 and October 
2014 (pifs 2013b; gfdrr 2013). 
Following a regional climate 
summit in Nadi in July, the Pacific 
is leading the way as the first region 
in the world to fully integrate disas-
ter risk management and climate 
change into a single overarching 
policy framework. For many years, 
government and donor priorities on 
disaster response have been guided by 
two separate frameworks: the Pacific 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management Framework for Action, 
and the Pacific Islands Framework 
for Action on Climate Change. The 
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (sprep) and 
supporting donors are developing a 
new combined strategy, to be called 
the Strategy for Climate and Resilient 
Development in the Pacific (srdp), to 
replace the existing regional policies 
when they expire in 2015 (Hay and 
Pratt 2013).
Climate policy was also a central 
feature of the annual Forum lead-
ers meeting, hosted by the Marshall 
Islands. RMI President Christopher 
Loeak and Minister in Assistance Tony 
de Brum mobilized support for the 
Majuro Declaration on Climate Lead-
ership, seeking commitments to reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions. Unlike his 
predecessor Hillary Clinton (who 
attended the 2012 summit in Cook 
Islands), US Secretary of State John 
Kerry did not attend the 2013 Majuro 
summit.
Small island states expressed their 
frustration at the failure of oecd 
countries to meet their pledges on 
climate finance and emissions reduc-
tion. Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele 
Sopoaga said: “Too much talking has 
been done on this issue; there is urgent 
need for real action on the ground” 
(sis 2013). In November, the Asian 
Development Bank (adb) released a 
report that estimates that the total 
climate-change cost in the Pacific will 
range from 2.9 percent to 12.7 percent 
political reviews • region in review 465
of annual gross domestic product by 
2100 (adb 2013).
Throughout the year, governments 
met to develop “island friendly” 
policies in the lead up to the Third 
Conference on Small Island Develop-
ing States, to be hosted in Sāmoa in 
September 2014. These policies will 
also be used at the UN secretary-
general’s 2014 climate summit, the 
2015 UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change negotiations in 
Paris for a global climate treaty, and a 
summit the same year to develop new 
“Sustainable Development Goals” to 
replace the 2000–2015 Millennium 
Development Goals.
As part of the new sustainable 
development goals, governments like 
Solomon Islands, Palau, and Nauru 
are lobbying for a new global goal 
to protect the oceans. In February, 
Tokelauan politician Foua Toloa 
was appointed to the Global Oceans 
Commission, a new body created to 
address serious challenges facing the 
high seas.
Trade policy continued to dominate 
the regional agenda. Forum Island 
governments participated in free-trade 
negotiations with Australia and New 
Zealand through the expanded Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions, known as pacer-Plus. They 
also strengthened their role under the 
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agree-
ment (picta), with more countries 
commencing trade under this Islands-
only accord. In October, Nauru 
ratified the picta Trade in Services 
Protocol, becoming only the second 
of ten countries to ratify the services 
agreement since it was opened for 
signature in August 2012.
Some Pacific governments 
expressed frustration over limits 
placed by Australia and New Zealand 
on agricultural imports, with PNG 
Trade Minister Richard Maru stat-
ing: “My country is not interested 
in pacer-Plus, our focus is the msg 
Trade Agreement. Our feeling at the 
moment is that pacer-Plus would be 
one sided in favour of Australia and 
New  Zealand. We are frustrated with 
them. We can’t export our taro there, 
they won’t accept our greens. There’s 
nothing to be gained from a trade 
agreement at the moment. We cannot 
justify the huge amount of resources 
we expend on such negotiations. They 
are a complete waste of time” (Pareti 
2013).
After ten years of negotiations and 
four missed deadlines, talks continued 
over the proposed Economic Partner-
ship Agreement (epa) between the 
European Union (EU) and Pacific 
members of the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific Group of States (pacp). 
The drawn-out epa negotiations 
are souring relations with the Euro-
pean Union, with Island governments 
critical of the inequality in the Pacific-
EU partnership, the bureaucracy and 
complexity of EU aid delivery, and 
EU fisheries policies that attempt to 
subvert the sustainability principles 
advocated by the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (ffa) and the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement. The European 
Centre for Development Policy and 
Management (ecdpm) acknowledged 
that “the perception exists that the 
EU has tried to use a trade agree-
ment on goods and services (epa) to 
put pressure on Pacific countries and 
the Western Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission to obtain advantageous 
measures that can further European 
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commercial interests” (Laporte and 
Puig 2013, 9).
In June, the European Commis-
sion published a “Draft Report for a 
Comprehensive EU Fishery Strategy 
in the Pacific Region,” which raised 
concern that access to fish remains the 
primary EU interest in the region. The 
draft document recommended that no 
derogation of rules of origin for fisher-
ies products be granted to any pacp 
country under the current epa negotia-
tions, unless the EU fishing industry is 
given increased access to island Exclu-
sive Economic Zones. EU officials also 
opposed ffa policy on the Vessel Day 
Scheme, which has been accepted by 
Asian deepwater fishing nations. (The 
Vessel Day Scheme allocates fishing 
days between ffa members and has 
led to increased fishing license rev-
enues for Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, and Tuvalu.)
EU negotiators are attempting to 
divide and rule, in spite of the stated 
commitment under the 2000 Coto-
nou agreement between the European 
Union and the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific group (acp) to promote 
regional integration. In July, the 
European Union suspended epa nego-
tiations after a request to introduce 
significant changes in pacp national 
laws dealing with the management of 
fisheries resources. There was a further 
impasse in negotiations in Brussels in 
October, with the European Union 
refusing to address Pacific agendas. 
In December, the EU trade commis-
sioner organized a hastily convened 
meeting of pacp Trade and Fisheries 
Ministers in Solomon Islands, but 
without representation from Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji, the only two 
countries that have signed interim 
epas because of their sugar and fish 
exports to Europe. There was a war 
of words after Fiji angrily condemned 
this maneuvering by the European 
Union and the Forum Secretariat 
(Vuibau 2013; pifs 2013a). 
Fiji will be affected by the new EU 
agricultural policy announced in June 
to abolish sugar quotas in 2017, three 
years earlier than expected. Develop-
ing countries are worried that an early 
abolition of quotas will cause the 
failure of many acp sugar industries. 
The European Union will also limit 
trade with nondemocratic regimes, 
which places pressure on the military-
backed government in Suva. Fiji must 
decide before 1 October 2014 whether 
to ratify its signature of an Interim epa 
with the European Union, as Papua 
New Guinea has done, or lose key 
trade advantages.
EU Climate Commissioner Con-
nie Hedegaard of Denmark visited 
Majuro in August for the Forum lead-
ers meeting, but her attempts to build 
an EU-Pacific alliance for the 2013 
UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change negotiations in Warsaw 
were undercut by these EU machina-
tions over fisheries and trade.
As payback, Forum leaders deferred 
the application by Spain to become 
a Post-Forum Dialogue Partner, even 
as Cuba was granted the status. Some 
Forum governments were angry over 
aggressive EU fishing operations, such 
as a Spanish fishing vessel being fined 
us$1 million for illegally fishing in 
Nauruan waters. (In contrast, Cuba 
has been training dozens of Islands 
medical personnel in Havana and 
works cooperatively with fellow mem-
bers of the Alliance of Small Island 
States [aosis] on climate policy.)
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Pacific diplomats are also working 
to strengthen the acp. Fiji’s former 
Foreign Minister Kaliopate Tavola 
and Sāmoa’s former Finance Secretary 
Kolone Vaai were members of an acp 
Eminent Persons Group discussing the 
future of the acp Group and its rela-
tions with the European Union. After 
a visit by the group to the region in 
March, a further meeting was held in 
Sāmoa in October, preceding consulta-
tions in the Caribbean and Africa.
The strengthening of the pacp, 
with a new regional secretariat in Port 
Moresby, reflected additional indepen-
dent diplomatic activity outside of the 
Pacific Islands Forum. 
Island perspectives on the new 
regionalism were best summarized by 
Roch Wamytan, the New Caledonian 
member of the 2013 msg Eminent 
Persons Group. When interviewed 
in Majuro in September, the Kanak 
leader told me that the major pow-
ers must respect the growing sense 
of autonomy in Island nations: “You 
see this across the region, especially 
with the Melanesians but also with 
the Polynesians and Micronesians. All 
of us want a certain autonomy and 
to cease constantly being under the 
influence of the colonial powers—or 
even the larger nations like Australia 
and New Zealand. We want to have 
a space where we can talk amongst 
ourselves without each time having 
to refer to the big countries, each of 
which have their own interests and 
agendas.” 
The two largest Melanesian 
nations, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, 
expanded their regional and interna-
tional roles, campaigning for South-
South engagement and advancing their 
own agenda on trade, decolonization, 
and aid (though not always acting in 
the interests of their smaller island 
neighbors). Other countries followed 
suit: In April, Solomon Islands offi-
cially opened a new diplomatic mis-
sion in Havana, to support more than 
100 medical students studying in the 
Cuban capital. In August, Solomon 
Islands’ first resident ambassador in 
Malaysia presented his credentials. 
The following month, the Solomon 
Islands deputy prime minister told the 
UN General Assembly, “We intend to 
strengthen our ties with the wider Asia 
and Pacific region, including asean 
[the Association of South East Asian 
Nations] and India” (Maelanga 2013).
While facing criticism for its eco-
nomic policies, constitutional vandal-
ism, and restraint of domestic political 
debate, the Bainimarama regime has 
been active on the regional and inter-
national stage. 
Over five years, Fiji has increased 
the number of overseas embassies 
from eleven to seventeen and is seek-
ing to expand the Pacific region’s links 
to emerging powers in the developing 
world. This diplomatic dynamism has 
reinforced growing debate about the 
Forum’s preeminence and the indepen-
dent role of subregional institutions, 
including the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (msg), the Micronesian Chief 
Executives meeting, and the Polyne-
sian Leaders Group (plg). 
plg criticism of the military regime 
in Fiji has been undercut by the desire 
of the Australian and New Zealand 
governments to rebuild relations with 
Suva, where they perceive grow-
ing political influence from China 
and other Asian powers. The Pacific 
Islands Forum Ministerial Contact 
Group visited Fiji in April, meeting 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola and Attorney General 
Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum.
Suspended from Forum meetings 
since 2009, Fiji has attempted to 
create new fora for Pacific nations to 
hold discussions on an Island-centered 
agenda. This foreign policy was 
 highlighted at the Melanesian Spear-
head Group summit in New Cale do nia 
in June and at the inaugural meeting 
of the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum (pidf), held in Fiji in August. 
This latter initiative by the Bainima-
rama regime, which received funding 
support from China, Kuwait, and 
the United Arab Emirates, serves two 
purposes: as a mechanism for debate 
about sustainable development in 
the Islands, but also as an alternative 
meeting place to the Forum, perceived 
as dominated by Australia and New 
Zealand. According to University of 
the South Pacific academic Sandra 
Tarte: “The pidf reflects a new dyna-
mism that has characterized Pacific 
regionalism over the past few years 
and that has challenged the estab-
lished donor-dominated crop system. 
Within this more fluid environment 
Pacific states have sought to take con-
trol of regional processes and agendas 
(whether fisheries, trade, or secu-
rity) through promoting alternative 
regional frameworks and alliances” 
(Tarte 2013, 6).
A unique feature of the pidf is that 
it included governments, business, 
and civil society organizations on an 
equal footing. The inaugural meeting 
discussed regional definitions of sus-
tainability and development, providing 
a platform for Timor-Leste President 
Xanana Gusmao, alongside leaders 
from Solomon Islands, Nauru, Kiri-
bati, and Federated States of Micro-
nesia. (Australia and New Zealand 
sent observers, but the Samoan gov-
ernment, long critical of the Bainima-
rama regime, declined to attend.) 
One practical outcome of the pidf 
was an agreement between Baini-
marama and Gusmao for members 
of the Fiji Volunteer Service to work 
in Timor-Leste in education and 
other sectors, with a memorandum 
of  understanding being signed in 
 November.
Critics of the military regime have 
suggested that the pidf may not 
survive beyond Fiji’s reintegration into 
the Forum, after scheduled elections 
in September 2014. However, Prime 
Minister Bainimarama has stated that 
there will be no reduction of support 
for the pidf: “This is a new initia-
tive by Fiji to bolster relationships 
between the island countries and allow 
us to try to work out our problems 
without external interference. Fiji’s 
problem with the Pacific Forum is 
that it’s dominated by Australia and 
New Zealand and they largely set 
the agenda. They’ve got a couple of 
Polynesian countries in their back 
pockets and managed to get Fiji sus-
pended. Fine. We’re not interested in 
coming back. We want a new regional 
structure without the Aussies and 
Kiwis that more reflects the concerns 
of Pacific Island nations. So this new 
body allows us to try to find solutions 
to our own problems, not solutions 
prescribed by our larger neighbours” 
(Bainimarama 2013a).
The Fiji government created a 
new pidf Secretariat and in October 
granted diplomatic status to the head-
quarters as an international organiza-
tion under the Diplomatic Privileges 
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and Immunities Act of 1971. This 
gives the pidf rights similar to those 
of other UN and crop agencies hosted 
in the country. It also  reinforced a 
sense of competition with the Suva-
based Forum Secretariat, which was 
the only major regional agency not 
represented at the founding pidf 
meeting.
Throughout the year, Fiji served 
as chair of the Group of 77 (g77) 
plus China—the first time a Pacific 
Island nation has led this 132-member 
bloc of developing nations within the 
United Nations. Taking up the chair-
manship in January, Bainimarama 
stated: “Today, South-South coopera-
tion remains our primary focus. The 
exchange of resources, technology 
and knowledge between developing 
nations has increased in importance 
and scope, and we believe strongly in 
South-South cooperation as a comple-
ment to North-South cooperation” 
(Bainimarama 2013b).
In May, the Fiji government hosted 
the “g77 plus China Panel of Emi-
nent Personalities of the South” at 
Natadola, to update the Development 
Platform for the South (Khor 2013). 
msg prime ministers and a range of 
developing country ambassadors and 
experts were joined by President Evo 
Morales of Bolivia, who takes over as 
g77 chair in 2014.
Following the meeting, Bainima-
rama stated: “In the interests of global 
harmony, equity and development, 
we must strengthen the development 
commitments of North-South, South-
South and triangular co-operation. . . .
We have also agreed on the need to 
reinforce the co-ordination of develop-
ing countries in our policy and joint 
negotiating positions on major issues 
in the international agenda” (Chaud-
hary 2013).
In spite of these diplomatic ini-
tiatives, it is not all smooth sailing. 
There are tensions within and between 
members of the Forum, the msg, and 
the plg over controversial topics like 
Fiji’s democracy, West Papua, trade, 
and decolonization. 
msg unity was challenged in 2013 
by a complex debate over West Papua 
and relations with Indonesia. Trade 
and aid links are growing between 
Port Moresby, Suva, and Jakarta, but 
there is also significant Melanesian 
solidarity in favor of self-determina-
tion for the West Papuan people, who 
face ongoing human rights abuses by 
the Indonesian police and military. (At 
year’s end, more than seventy political 
prisoners were in jail in West Papua, 
with more than 530 arrests of pro-
independence activists during 2013.)
The West Papua National Council 
for Liberation (wpncl), which has 
an information office in Port Vila, 
formally applied for membership at 
the msg leaders summit in June (in 
line with the precedent of the flnks 
independence movement being a full 
msg member in place of the Govern-
ment of New Caledonia). wpncl lead-
ers were formally invited to attend and 
address the msg summit in Noumea, 
to the annoyance of Indonesia, which 
already has observer status. In spite of 
lobbying by West Papuan representa-
tives, the msg leaders agreed to defer 
the wpncl application until a delega-
tion of Melanesian foreign ministers 
could visit Jakarta and Jayapura. 
The summit revealed that Vanuatu 
and New Caledonia’s flnks are more 
supportive of wpncl membership, 
while Papua New Guinea and Fiji 
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have much closer ties to Indonesia 
(with the Bainimarama regime build-
ing economic and political links with 
the Asian power through the Non-
Aligned Movement and g77). Solomon 
Islands has swung closer to Indonesia 
as well, with Prime Minister Gor-
don Darcy Lilo traveling to Jakarta 
in August on a trade mission, which 
the Vanuatu government perceived 
as an effort to undercut the foreign 
ministers’ delegation. Vanuatu later 
boycotted the mission to West Papua 
after Indonesia transformed the trip 
into a trade mission and refused access 
to pro-independence church and civil 
society representatives during a brief 
visit to Jayapura.
Greater solidarity was shown with 
the Maohi self-determination move-
ment in French Polynesia, led by 
Oscar Manutahi Temaru. In a major 
breakthrough after years of lobby-
ing, a consensus resolution of the UN 
General Assembly in May reinscribed 
French Polynesia on the UN list of 
non-self-governing territories, even as 
Temaru lost the election for the local 
assembly in Tahiti. 
The UN resolution, fiercely 
opposed by the French government 
and incoming French Polynesian 
President Gaston Flosse, was initi-
ated by Solomon Islands, Nauru, and 
Tuvalu, with active support from other 
Island nations (Maclellan 2013b). It 
opens the way for greater interna-
tional scrutiny of France’s policies in 
French Polynesia: in December, the 
UN General Assembly decided to 
send a mission to French Polynesia to 
investigate the economic, social, and 
environmental impacts of thirty years 
of French nuclear testing.
msg solidarity with New Cale-
donia’s flnks provides a crucial 
platform for the Kanak independence 
movement as the French dependency 
moves to May 2014 congressional 
elections. (By a three-fifths majority, 
the incoming Congress can decide 
to proceed to a referendum on self-
determination before 2018.) In its 
role as msg chair, the flnks has 
an important platform for gaining 
international support. A month after 
the msg summit, Forum Chair Sir 
Henry Puna of the Cook Islands led a 
long-delayed Forum mission to New 
Caledonia to review the progress of 
the 1998 Noumea Accord—the first 
official Forum visit in eight years. The 
United Nations sent a formal mission 
in March 2014 to investigate disputes 
over the electoral roll for the crucial 
May elections.
Following the postcoup collapse 
of the Fiji Human Rights Commis-
sion (the only one of its type in the 
Islands), the Asia-Pacific Forum for 
National Human Rights Institutions 
has been investigating the establish-
ment of national human rights insti-
tutions in other Forum Island coun-
tries. After the Parliament of Samoa 
passed the Ombudsman (Komesina O 
Sulufaiga) Act of 2013, the National 
Human Rights Institution of Samoa 
was officially launched on Interna-
tional Human Rights Day, 10 Decem-
ber. The Forum Secretariat has also 
been promoting national consultations 
on human rights, with meetings held 
in Vanuatu, Palau, and Niue during 
the year.
A focus on human rights in Austra-
lia was the campaign by the Australian 
South Sea Islander (assi) community 
to mark the 150th anniversary of the 
1863 arrival of the schooner Don 
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Juan. The vessel’s landfall in Aus-
tralia, carrying sixty-seven Islanders 
to work on the Queensland cotton 
plantations, was the start of the 
blackbirding era. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, nearly sixty thou-
sand Melanesians had been coerced, 
kidnapped, or indentured to work 
in cotton fields and sugarcane farms 
across Queensland and northern New 
South Wales.
The Australian-born descendants 
of those Melanesian workers orga-
nized in 2013 to remember the Pacific 
labor trade and to assert contem-
porary demands. Between June and 
August, there were exhibitions and 
talks across Queensland, together with 
ceremonies in Port Vila in July. The 
anniversary year ended in November 
with a conference to elect a National 
assi Secretariat, which will lobby for 
greater recognition.
The Pacific ecumenical movement 
has also continued to advocate for 
human rights, self-determination, 
trade, and environmental issues. This 
social justice agenda was mandated 
by the 10th General Assembly of 
the Pacific Conference of Churches 
(pcc), held in Honiara in March. pcc 
General Secretary Reverend François 
Pihaatae of French Polynesia has 
called for action on nuclear issues: 
“We must speak out, for if we remain 
silent the larger countries will be 
under the misconception that their 
testing, development and construction 
of nuclear weapons are acceptable. . . .
That is why we will continue to call 
for a global ban on nuclear weapons. 
These weapons are no good for the 
Pacific and no good for the world” 
(ican 2014, 5).
Women’s groups were active on 
issues of security, joining other civil 
society organizations in May for a 
regional dialogue on conflict, peace, 
and security at the Forum Secretariat. 
More than two hundred delegates 
attended the 12th Triennial Confer-
ence of Pacific Women in Rarotonga 
in October, debating representation in 
parliament, sexual and reproductive 
rights, and violence in the home and 
community.
In July, the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) 
celebrated its tenth anniversary in 
Honiara, with Forum Secretary-Gen-
eral Slade noting that “ramsi stands 
out as an example of regional coop-
eration and partnership at its best” 
(pifs 2013c).
ramsi is winding down, with 
the removal of military forces from 
Solomon Islands and, beginning 1 July 
2013, the transition from ramsi’s 
development assistance programs to 
bilateral agreements with Australia, 
New Zealand, and other donors. 
The only truly regional component 
of ramsi, with staff from all six-
teen Forum member countries, is the 
Participating Police Force, which will 
continue until 2017.
Post-ramsi, Papua New Guinea is 
working with Fiji on regional peace-
keeping. Military leaders from Suva 
and Port Moresby have agreed to 
pool together their forces under a 
new defense cooperation agreement 
incorporating the Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces (rfmf) and the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force. The 
Melanesian Spearhead Group began 
looking at an msg Police Formed Unit 
in 2011, to send police officers on 
international peacekeeping missions. 
At their June 2013 summit in New 
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Caledonia, this concept was expanded 
as msg leaders endorsed the establish-
ment of a Department of Peacekeeping 
 Operations.
Fiji is looking beyond traditional 
allies for military training and equip-
ment. In May, Prime Minister Baini-
marama traveled to China to meet 
Premier Li Keqiang and President 
Xi Jinping. He also announced talks 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
while in Moscow for the Rugby  Sevens 
World Cup in June. A Fiji military 
 delegation visited China in Novem-
ber, led by Minister for Defence and 
National Security Joketani Cokanasiga 
and the rfmf chief of staff, Brigadier 
General Mohammed Aziz. The delega-
tion met China’s Minister of National 
Defense General Chang Wanquan to 
discuss cooperation and exchanges 
between the rfmf and the People’s 
Liberation Army.
Perceiving that China and other 
developing powers are expanding 
their political influence in the Islands 
region, the Australia–New Zealand–
United States Security Treaty (anzus) 
allies have been seeking to improve 
their own strategic dialogue. 
In May, the inaugural South Pacific 
Defence Ministers Meeting (spdmm) 
was held in Nuku‘alofa. Ministers, 
ambassadors, and military officers 
from Australia, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Tonga, France, and 
Chile (but not Fiji) met with  observers 
from the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the first of a series of 
annual summits (Maclellan 2013a). 
The same month, the Forum Secre-
tariat and the United Nations Devel-
opment Program convened a meeting 
in Fiji on “Security Sector Governance 
in the Pacific,” to propose national 
policies to coordinate police, customs, 
immigration, and defense forces.
At the spdmm, defense minis-
ters agreed on new regional war 
games to be called Exercise Povai 
Endeavour. The Australian govern-
ment announced the extension of its 
Pacific Patrol Boat Program, which 
has provided vessels and naval advi-
sors to Island governments since the 
1980s. Under a new Pacific Maritime 
Security Program, aging patrol boats 
will be replaced after 2018. Western 
powers will increase maritime surveil-
lance programs in Island exclusive 
economic zones through the Quadri-
lateral Defence Coordination Group.
After a series of meetings to pre-
pare the ground, the United States 
and New Zealand announced the 
formal resumption of bilateral military 
cooperation. Regional tours in 2010 
and 2012 by former US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and US Secretary 
of Defense Leon Panetta announced a 
revised policy on ship visits, but this 
was formally confirmed in Octo-
ber 2013 by Obama administration 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and 
NZ Minister of Defence Jonathan 
Coleman. 
The decision comes nearly thirty 
years after the US government 
imposed a military embargo on New 
Zealand, after Wellington banned all 
nuclear armed and powered vessels 
from entering NZ waters. US and 
NZ agencies secretly resumed intel-
ligence sharing in 2009, but the latest 
announcement opens the way for joint 
exercises and naval exchanges. A New 
Zealand warship will visit Pearl Har-
bor, Hawai‘i, as part of the rimpac 
2014 naval exercises, the first such 
visit in more than three decades.
political reviews • region in review 473
Australia and Papua New Guinea 
held their inaugural bilateral Defence 
Ministers Meeting on 10 December, 
and Port Moresby will host the next 
regional spdmm in 2014, a reflec-
tion of broader security coordination 
between Canberra, Wellington, and 
Port Moresby (Maclellan 2014b, 25). 
Just before Christmas, PNG Prime 
Minister O’Neill launched the coun-
try’s first ever National Security Policy 
and an updated Defence White Paper, 
after increasing defense spending to 
188 million kina (a$94 million) in the 
2013 PNG budget.
Regional security issues also came 
to the fore with the release of docu-
ments by US whistle-blower Edward 
Snowden, which revealed signals 
 intelligence operations by the US 
National Security Agency (nsa) and 
affiliated agencies from the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada (the so-called five eyes 
alliance). 
Documents released by Snowden 
show that the nsa and its partners 
have monitored the phones of the 
leaders of Germany, France, Brazil, 
and Indonesia. The Australian Signals 
Directorate (asd) was revealed to be 
monitoring the personal phones of 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, his wife, and key officials. 
The government of Timor-Leste 
has also raised concern over reports 
that the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Service (asis) had bugged government 
offices in Dili during 2004 discus-
sions on the Timor Gap Treaty, which 
governs maritime boundaries and oil 
reserves in the waters between Aus-
tralia and Timor-Leste. Newspapers 
reported that US intelligence agencies 
have engaged in commercial espionage 
against Brazilian and French energy 
and oil corporations (Coppola 2013).
Revelations over Australian intel-
ligence operations against Indonesia 
and Timor-Leste have sparked concern 
in Pacific countries, with PNG Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill stating: “We 
know this might be happening, but it 
would certainly be a breach of trust. 
Among friends, this is not necessary. 
If there are issues to be discussed, all 
they have to do is pick up the phone 
and give us a call, as they do on many 
other matters. Under our laws, it is 
illegal to tap phones, a serious crimi-
nal matter” (Callick 2013, 22).
American and allied agencies have 
also bugged trade and climate sum-
mits, including UN meetings and the 
g20. US agencies intercepted com-
munications before and during the 
2009 Copenhagen climate negotia-
tions, monitoring EU, g77, and aosis 
positions, with leaked nsa documents 
 stating: “Signals intelligence will 
undoubtedly play a significant role 
in keeping our negotiators as well 
informed as possible throughout the 
two-week event” (Gjerding and others 
2014).
Former Central Intelligence Agency 
Director Michael Hayden has stated 
that, unlike the Chinese government, 
the United States does not use its 
surveillance capacity for economic 
purposes: “We steal these secrets to 
keep our citizens free and safe. We 
don’t steal secrets to make our citizens 
rich” (Potter 2014, 21). However, 
documents from the Snowden cache 
directly contradict this assertion. The 
New York Times revealed that Austra-
lia’s asd had gathered information on 
Indonesian trade negotiations with the 
United States and had offered to share 
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this information with the US govern-
ment (Risen and Poitras 2014). 
In December 2013, Australian 
Attorney General George Brandis 
approved raids by the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation 
(asio) on the lawyer who is mounting 
Timor-Leste’s arbitration case against 
Australia before the International 
Court of Justice on disputed maritime 
boundaries and oil revenues. The asio 
raided the home of the senior asis 
intelligence officer who was report-
edly involved in the bugging of Timor 
government offices in 2004, when 
former Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer was in government. (Today, 
Downer’s consulting company has a 
contract with Woodside Petroleum, 
the transnational corporation involved 
in Timor Sea oil exploration.)
The potential revelation of similar 
activities in the Pacific Islands may 
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